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ARTICLES

BALANCING LAW AND POLITICS:
SENATE OVERSIGHT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OFFICE
JOSEPH

R.

BIDEN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

My responsibility is to speak of Congress' oversight function and specifically that of the Judiciary Committee's oversight of the
Attorney General's office. I can sum up my thoughts by just suggesting that with the Attorney General office's progression and the
additional duties and employees it has taken on, the evolution of
congressional oversight has also progressed. That is, congressional
oversight grew as the office's importance and scope grew. When
there was an Attorney General working out of his own private law
office with no secretaries, no clerks, and no salary, there was very
little oversight. Now, when there is an Attorney General that has
close to 80,000 employees under his direct control and the responsibility for enforcing, honestly and vigorously, the volumes of new
laws that were passed since 1789, there is considerably greater oversight. I could end by saying that the degree to which the Senate has
engaged in vigorous oversight relates less to the vigor possessed by
the chairperson of that committee - the Judiciary Committee than to the degree to which the Attorney General and the President
conclude that they are going to politicize the office. Politicize it ideologically, by deciding that they are going to see their social agenda
passed through the office of Attorney General rather than through
the legislative process, or politicize it by using the judicial nominating process to remake the Judiciary in the President's own image.
That is when sparks begin to fly.
* United States Senator, Delaware; Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary; J.D., Syracuse University. This article is an edited version of
a speech presented by Senator Biden at the Attorney General Conference, held at
The John Marshall Law School on September 22, 1989.
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With that broad overview in mind, I will generally speak to the
question of congressional oversight and the Attorney General. As
should be pointed out, this is a subject that has received little scholarly attention relative to other significant offices of the government.
This lack of attention is odd because the separation of power issues
that are raised by this oversight are more controversial, deeply
rooted, and confused when pertaining to the Attorney General than
they are for any other government official. This symposium's willingness to focus on these issues, and hopefully to help illuminate
some of the points and issues that have been left in the darkness for
some time, will serve us all well.
I have been in the United States Senate since 1973. In my seventeen and a half years we have had ten Attorneys General. It has
been somewhat tumultuous from 1973 through 1990 in terms of the
relationship of the Attorneys General to the Congress generally, and
the American people even more generally. There has perhaps never
been a period with as much consistent controversy over such a long
time.
In the last seventeen years, there have been moments when the
relationship between the Attorney General and the Senate Judiciary
Committee could best be described by making a comparison to the
relationship that existed between the woman who won the Lottery
and her husband. As Senator Strom Thurmond tells the story, a woman won the Lottery for a million dollars in South Carolina and
immediately, in her exultation, she called her husband and said,
"Honey, I won the Lottery for a million dollars. Pack your clothes."
And he said, "Winter or summer?" She said, "Both." He said,
"Where are we going?" She said, "I don't know, but just get the hell
out."
That is a little bit like the relationship between the Senate and
the Attorney General's office in the ten years that I have had the
pleasure of serving on the Judiciary Committee. With that introduction, let me now elaborate.
I.

EARLY HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Accepting the invitation to contribute to a law school publication named after John Marshall is in and of itself daunting. Marshall's greatness can be measured in many ways, but one of the best
ways to size him up is to think about the jobs that he turned down.
In 1795 George Washington asked John Marshall to be Attorney
General, and Marshall declined. He wanted to concentrate on his
work at the bar in Virginia. Three years later President Adams offered him a place on the Supreme Court, and again Marshall said
no. You will not believe why he refused his seat on the Supreme
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Court. He refused his seat on the Supreme Court because he wanted
to run for the House of Representatives. How times have changed.
Marshall went through a very muddy and dirty campaign, but
he came out a winner. Eventually Marshall agreed to go and serve
on the Court, for what ultimately turned out to be thirty-five years.
John Marshall set not only the tone, but the direction of the Supreme Court and its basic relationship with the Congress as well as
the President - a direction which has been followed for the past
200 years. I suspect that there hasn't been another man who has
been offered as many jobs in high public office, or served with more
distinction.
The point I would like to make is that just as political priorities
have changed since Mr. Marshall refused to take a seat on the Court
because he wanted to run for Congress, so too have the responsibilities and the involvement of the Attorney General in the affairs of
the American people changed. Many of the concepts underlying the
notion of civil rights, antitrust law, tax law, environmental law,
criminal law, and civil law did not even exist in Marshall's day, let
alone the specific statutory laws which now exist. The concepts
didn't even exist when the early Attorneys General took on the responsibility of being "somebody's" lawyer.
It has never been completely clear who the Attorney General
represents.' This is one of the reasons why there is such tension.
Whose lawyer is the Attorney General? Is he the President's lawyer
alone? Does he have a relationship with the bench which requires
him as an officer of the court to in fact take positions different than
those which are being fostered by the President of the United
States, if the Attorney General disagrees with them or believes them
to be unconstitutional? Is he, as he was in the early days, "the people's lawyer" as well as a legal advisor to the United States
Congress?
In some ways, as I said, the topic that I have been assigned,
"The Oversight Function of the Senate Judiciary Committee,"
tracks this debate and the changes related to the power that has
been ceded by Congress to the administration, to the executive
branch, and to the Attorney General. We have directed the Attorney
General and the administration to do a lot of things over the intervening 200 years. I think that if we could transport John Marshall
and the other founding fathers to the late twentieth century, they
would not recognize much of what is now the office of Attorney General other than possibly one piece, and that is, believe it or not, the
1. Meador, The President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice, in THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1
(1980).
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concept of the Congress' oversight function.
It is interesting to think about. The original and early Attorneys
General had but five employees until roughly 1865.2 The way things
were done then, in terms of oversight, was that the chairperson of
the Judiciary Committee or the leaders of the Congress, would have
dinner with the Attorney General. They would sit down, and they
would talk about what the Attorney General was and was not doing
and what they would like or not like the Attorney General to investigate. This personal relationship served an oversight function.
One of the earliest committees set up in the United States Senate was the Judiciary Committee. The notion that this Committee
was to undertake a more formalized oversight responsibility evolved
as changes took place in terms of population, size of the government, and the responsibilities that were delegated to the Attorney
General. However, what would probably strike our founding fathers
most starkly, if they came back today, would be how different the
world of Washington, D.C., is from the world that they left behind
- a world where a handful of gentlemanly friends ran all the
branches of government. Moreover, they did it in a very informal
way, notwithstanding some of the very formal requirements set out
in the Constitution.'
As our system has evolved, however, the interdependence between the Congress and the Executive, and between the Judiciary
Committee and the Attorney General, has taken many forms. On
one level, executive branch officers are obligated to enforce the laws
written by the United States Congress, signed by the President of
the United States, and enacted into law. Congress then is required
to watch over and see that the law's intent is in fact carried out by
the Executive. On another level the Congress exerts leverage on the
Executive Department thanks to its control over the purse strings."
Sometimes Congress has done it responsibly; sometimes it has done
it irresponsibly. The Attorney General has to listen to Congress because it is Congress who writes the check the Attorney General
2. H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 219-33 (1937).
3. I might note parenthetically almost all the important powers that are granted
to this government are shared and ill defined. I sit on the Foreign Relations Committee, and have had the privilege and honor of being involved in the debates on the
War Powers Act. As we learned in these debates, the power to make war is not clearly
defined in the Constitution - which is why it is still being debated to this very day.
Think about it: we have not even figured out, to this day, what the precise relationship is between the Congress and the Executive in terms of the power to make war.
For a more detailed discussion on the confusion generated over this subject, see Koh,
Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 59-60 (1988).
4. See, e.g., Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (ex-

amines Congress' constitutional authority to regulate and appropriate federal
spending).
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needs to get the job done. To put it in very crass terms, that is the
ultimate power. The Attorney General also has to listen to Congress
at the outset because he must be confirmed. Most Attorneys General
are honorable men and women - in this case all men, and I look
forward to the day when it is a woman - and most will not say
under oath at their confirmation hearing something that in fact they
will not uphold. So, the confirmation process is another example of
oversight because the Attorney General must speak to the members
of the Congress and the Committee during the confirmation period.
On a less formal level the Attorney General and the Senate Judiciary Committee have to practice the give and take of politics with
one another, because if we don't, nothing gets accomplished. No
one's agenda is satisfied. Through the media, through budgetary
politics, through nomination reviews, through speeches to interest
groups, leaders of each of the branches of government can make the
lives of their counterparts very difficult if they are not willing to
share power. This is how the system of checks and balances works
and how it has evolved. I would respectfully suggest, moreover, that
it is not likely ever to be perfected. The system does not lend itself
to being perfected.
Finally, through this evolutionary process we get to the point
where we can speak specifically of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
oversight function of the Attorney General. Now, having said that
the Congress does properly share power with the Executive, let me
suggest that oversight is not the most appropriate term in my view
to describe the function, although that is the term always used.
Oversight connotes that Congress sits over and above the Attorney General in a position of greater authority. In my view the better
description of the relationship would be "sidesight" rather than
oversight. Congress and the Executive are equal actors operating on
the same plane, checking and balancing one another in a dynamic
give and take of power in a three-part government. I have no illusions that "sidesight" is a phrase that will be coined or minted very
soon, but it does more fully suggest the shared power relationship
between the Congress and the Executive.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

If the Senate does properly keep watch on the Attorney General, the degree of vigilance and the amount of interaction depends
largely on the actions and agenda of the Attorney General. In my
view the Attorney General has some duties that make him unlike
any other cabinet officer. He or she is obviously a political actor; it is
in the first instance only an ally of the President who gets appointed
Attorney General. The President expects the Attorney General to
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further an agenda - and as our new Attorney General has made
very clear - it is in most cases the Attorney General's intention to
carry out the administration's political agenda.
There are, of course, rare exceptions - men of such independence, power, esteem, and integrity - that they can protect the independence of their office. I would argue that one is from this very
city of Chicago. Former Attorney General Edward Levi is one of
these true exceptions, because of his character and the moment at
which he arrived in office, Levi remained appropriately independent
in his tenure. But unlike Attorney General Levi, most Attorneys
General are not possessed of that strength - nor are they given that
opportunity. To state it bluntly, Levi could have said or done anything he wanted to and the President of the United States could not
have done a thing about it without guaranteeing that he would no
longer be President.
Even in the more common situation, though, the Attorney General is unlike other cabinet officers. The Attorney General is an officer of the court, and in many ways represents the integrity of the
legal system. To the extent that officers of the court are to be above
partisan politics, the Attorney General is expected to work on a nonpartisan plane. The Attorney General is also the nation's chief law
enforcement officer. To the extent that our law enforcement officers
are a threat to all of us, as well as a protection for all of us, the
Attorney General is expected to apply the laws equally and fairly.
The Attorney General cannot appear to play favorites for any purpose; politics, ideology, or other.
When the Attorney General appears to be playing favorites
-whether or not he actually is - that is when things begin to take
flight. Indeed the American legal system is dedicated precisely to
promoting, for all of us as a society, the notion of justice. This requires the Attorney General to have a sense of balance and proportion that we expect from no other political appointee.
The special nature of the Attorney General's office is recognized
by many of the scholars contributing to this symposium. Other
scholars have also written on the subject, as have those individuals
who have occupied the office in the past. Griffin Bell, who became
the Attorney General at the time when the office had been tattered
by the scandal of Watergate, describes the tension of being immersed in the Executive Branch on the one hand and on the other
hand having to remain independent from it with this quote: "The
Attorney General wears so many hats that his independence is difficult to establish or to sustain."' A very distinguished scholar, Daniel
5. G. BELL, TAKING
August 2, 1982, p. 1).

CARE OF THE LAW

(cited in Legal Times of Washington,
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Meador also said:
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, the Attorney
General is bound to act in accordance with the professional canons of
ethics and the rules of the court. At the same time, however, he serves
at the pleasure of the President who has an enormous array of political and public concerns. These concerns, coupled with the subordinate
position of the Attorney General, can and do influence, for better or
worse, the opinions and actions of the Attorney General in his role as
an attorney.'
Consequently, the Attorney General is an individual who frequently
feels pulled in several directions, and in my view the tension is normal and not problematic. It is to be expected. I know of no way to
do away with that tension, and I would respectfully suggest if we
found a way, the cure would probably be much worse than the present disease which occasionally inflicts the office.
What is a problem is when the tension gives way to slack, as
happens in the tug of war when the rope breaks. Then the Attorney
General falls backward into the mud pit of narrow partisan politics
or extreme ideology. When this happens, when the Attorney General
loses his balance and begins to serve only his political masters at the
expense of his special duties as the nation's chief law enforcement
officer, the Congress has an obligation to step in and attempt to restore the balance. In other words, the Senate Judiciary Committee's
oversight function is to ensure that the Attorney General balances
his responsibilities in ways which preserve the integrity of the legal
system which he represents. When the Committee or others in Congress feel that the balance has been lost, we are duty-bound to act.
Our purpose in these instances must be to check and balance unhealthy forces within the Executive Branch, recognizing that the Attorney General's office is truly unique and potentially in need of
special care from the outside.
One way to bring to life this notion of the Attorney General's
special duties, and Congress' corresponding oversight responsibilities, is to review a few cases when the Attorney General's actions
grossly violated the norms of the office and the Senate employed its
oversight power with unusual vigor. From such instances, we get a
practical sense of where the lines are drawn.
But before I revisit some of those moments of extreme conflict
between the Attorney General and the Congress, let me touch briefly
on an episode that occurred during World War II when Franklin
Roosevelt put the Attorney General of that day, Francis Biddle, on
the rack, pulling him, for political reasons, in one direction while
Biddle's commitment to the first amendment as he saw it, pulled
6.

Meador, supra note 1, at 1.
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him in another direction. 7 The episode, I think, is instructive precisely because I think it shows how hard it is to achieve balance in
the real world.
The issue was this: Should the Justice Department go after and
prosecute wartime radicals who were making and printing "seditious
utterances?" These "radicals" were critiquing America's participation in war or even taking sides with the Fascists. The Congress, as
you might expect, and the President, who you would hope ideally
would not be in this case, were asking for something to be done.
Biddle, a devout civil libertarian, was opposed to prosecutions. He
cited Justice Holmes' opinion after World War I that, "We do not
lose our right to condemn the measures of men because the Country
is at war."'8 Roosevelt, however, was outraged by the seditionists and
insisted that Biddle go after them aggressively. Congress also
weighed in, decrying the administration's failure to silence these
radicals.
Roosevelt and the Congress on one side, and Biddle on the
other, were both motivated by good reasons and good intentions.
What ensued was a six-month behind the scene struggle between
Biddle and Roosevelt with the President urging a roundup of the
seditionists and Biddle trying to preserve first amendment
protections.
As it turned out, Biddle decided he would have to compromise
and prosecute more than two dozen of the most offensive seditionists in order to satisfy Roosevelt and the Congress, and I might add,
the press at the time. He sought thereby to abate the pressures to
engage in more wholesale suppression of dissident speech as happened in the Red Witch Hunt during and shortly after World War I.
Was Biddle wrong? Did Biddle compromise on his principles?
Or did Biddle deal with the tensions that are inherent in the office,
faced with a particular critical political decision, and do what was
right for the Constitution as well as faithfully serving the office of
Attorney General? Should he have resigned instead of compromising
his principles as he understood the first amendment? Were
Roosevelt and the Congress and much of the press right in saying
Biddle was too much of a Civil Libertarian? I think it is an incident
which demonstrates just how difficult it is for the Attorney General
to balance his political loyalties to his employer the President, and
his loyalties to the law as he understands it.
As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I would like to
think that were such a scenario to repeat itself today, we would be
7. Washburn, FDR versus his own Attorney General: The Struggle over Sedition, 1941-42, JOURNALISM Q., 717-725 (Winter, 1985).
8.

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208 (1919).
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able to consider the Attorney General's actions and the pressures
affecting him as judiciously as the complexities of the event warrant.
But I am a politician, in addition to being a lawyer, and I understand how things grip the nation.
Just look at what happened after one individual burned the
United States' flag on the steps of a building in Texas. We then had,
pending in the Senate, a Constitutional Amendment; the first one
ever offered in the history of the United States of America that
would amend the first amendment. This amendment would have
given the states a constitutional right to determine; what a flag is,
what constitutes desecration, and what actions they selectively wish
to outlaw. Under this Constitutional Amendment, the State of Illinois could have passed a law saying that when the Socialist Convention meets next wednesday, it is against the law for them to display
the American flag. And this law would be constitutional.
Well, I conclude the Senate acted responsibly. The Senate Judiciary Committee turned down the Constitutional Amendment, and
the amendment was also rejected by the full Senate.9 At any rate,
the point is we have these sort of occasions, and the Attorney General is going to be faced with the same kinds of pressures.
Other cases have not been so tough to call. I am thinking here
of the Nixon Administration and the numerous moral, political, and
legal transgressions that occurred in the Attorney General's office in
those infamous days. It is a familiar history, and I will not take the
time to go over it. Instead, let us turn our attention to the particulars of the congressional oversight function.
A.

Senate Oversight: Confirmation

I would like to suggest to you a few of the numerous occasions
when the oversight function takes place. It seems to me, as a member of the Senate, that we obviously have an oversight function as it
relates to, in the first instance, confirming or not confirming an Attorney General. We are required to look into his or her background.
We are required to make judgments. Nowhere is it defined precisely
how we should go about making those judgments, except to suggest
that it is a decision to be made by each individual Senator. We are
required to responsibly look into the background and get commitments from an Attorney General as to how he or she would enforce
the law. The relationship of the Attorney General to the President
versus his role as the chief law enforcement office is also, always a
subject of discussion. This is because we have had so many exper9. On October 19, 1989, the U.S. Senate rejected the Constitutional Amendment
by a 51-48 vote. See Cong. Rec. at 513733 (Oct. 19, 1989).
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iences with Democratic as well as Republican presidents who have,
in fact, decided that the Attorney General's office is a political instrument to be used either as a scalpel or a bludgeon.
So we debate the subject among ourselves, and we raise the
questions at confirmation. But in terms of the oversight, we never
resolve it, except in our own individual minds. We have not come
forward - nor, I would respectfully suggest, will any Judiciary
Committee ever come forward - with a clearly defined basis upon
which you are going to be able to question a nominee for Attorney
General on precisely how he or she would act relative to his or her
precise responsibilities which are still ill-defined, to the President, to
the Congress, to the Court, and to the American people.
B.

Senate Oversight: Ethics

The other area of oversight is when, as in the case of the Nixon
administration and others, ethical conduct is in question. The oversight function of the Senate Judiciary Committee is then brought in
full force, rightly or wrongly.
For example, when you can establish that a corporation was not
prosecuted under the antitrust laws because they gave a big contribution to a President's campaign - that is an ethical question. In
such cases, it seems fairly clear as to what the oversight responsibility is of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. It has at a
bare minimum the responsibility to attempt to determine whether
or not that action took place.
C.

Senate Oversight: Attorney General's Role in Judicial
Appointments

There is also the circumstance, as was mentioned earlier, relating to judicial appointments. Initially, the Attorney General did not
have the primary responsibility of deciding who would be on the
bench and shepherding that person through the confirmation process. However, now the Attorney General is deeply involved in that
process. I would note parenthetically that at this very moment there
is still a great debate going on over who is in charge. Is it the Attorney General or White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray, who runs the
selection process? This confusion is one of the reasons why, I respectfully suggest, we currently have more than fifty judicial vacancies without nominees pending before our Committee.
Now, when it is decided by the President - as it has been by
Democratic as well as Republican presidents - that it is his intention to remake the Judiciary in his image, the Senate says, "We
have as much right to do that as you do, Mr. President. And we are
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going to measure much more clearly the ideology of the nominee."
Basically, there exist unwritten rules when, as in the Eisenhower days, ideology is not put front and center. Consequently, the
Senate did not get involved in ideology. So, the oversight function as
it relates to another one of the responsibilities of the Justice Department is engaged or disengaged, is intense or not intense, depending
upon what the motivation is of the Attorney General and the President at the moment.
D. Senate Oversight: Law Enforcement
A fourth area of oversight concerns the question of impartial
and vigorous enforcement of the laws. We have had presidents Democratic as well as Republican - over the years who have decided that notwithstanding Congress' passage of certain laws, and
notwithstanding these presidents' signatures on the law, these presidents have had no intention of enforcing the law, for political or
ideological reasons.
For example, there is some argument to be made that the antitrust laws of this nation warrant revamping. That is a debate beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of one's views of current
antitrust law, however, the laws remain on the books and the Attorney General continues to have a duty to enforce them. So when the
Reagan Administration argued that they would not enforce current
antitrust laws because, from their ideological perspective, the antitrust laws are inimical to America's capacity to compete in the world
economy, the Senate got interested. We had debates. The Judiciary
Committee heard the head of the antitrust division, say, "The law,
is in fact, anticompetitive."
"Do you doubt, prospective Deputy Attorney General, that it is
the law?" - we asked.
"No, I don't doubt that it is the law. You have read the law
correctly. But we don't think that it enhances economic growth.
Therefore we are not going to enforce it."
This dialogue engages the interest of Congress. This perspective
interests the Judiciary Committee.
I should add that this same engagement occurs in other areas.
When Congress passes a law establishing a Department of Education - rightly or wrongly - and the President signs it, we expect
the leaders of that department to take its mission seriously. So when
a prospective Secretary of Education comes to the Senate to be confirmed, and we ask, "What is your priority," and he says, "My priority is to eliminate the Department of Education" - that engages
the Senate.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:151

Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee is engaged when the
Attorney General or a nominee interprets the law in a way that the
vast majority of Congress thinks is incorrect; or does not interpret
the law at all but instead ignores it. Some would argue that during
the last eight years, this is what the Reagan Administration did relative to civil rights laws in this country. They made a fundamental,
ideological decision that the civil rights laws were in fact anti-civil
rights - the laws violated the civil rights of the majority of American people. The Administration would not seek repeal of laws, which
is what they should have done given their views. Instead, they decided not to enforce those laws, or at least not enforce them vigorously. That engages the interest of the Congress.
To this point, I have talked about transgressions of Attorneys
General. There are equally as many transgressions of the Congress.
In the past, Congress has used its oversight power to constrain or
influence the legitimate functioning of the Attorney General's office.
Because we are never going to be able to define precisely what the
power of the Attorney General is, and because ultimately, the ability
of the Attorney General's office to function rests upon the Congress
appropriating the money to allow that to be done, you find there is
usually compromise, in the name of oversight.
This kind of give-and-take oversight is occurring right now, in
the drug policy area. We - Congress and the administration - are
now trying to put together a drug strategy. I should accept some
blame in that. I wrote the law to set up the so-called "drug czar." I
believe it is the only hope we have to abate the drug crisis. It took
me eight years to get the law passed, and guess what, the Attorney
General doesn't like it a little bit. Not even a tiny little bit. Nor
would any Attorney General, Democrat or Republican, because it in
effect takes power from the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Attorney General, among others. This is why President Carter didn't want my bill. It's why President Reagan vetoed
my bill. It requires the Attorney General to yield on the strategy
and management of an issue that falls in part under the aegis of his
office.
Looking at it another way, however, this is a case of where Congress, in its oversight of how the drug laws are being enforced, has
stepped in and said, "We are, in effect, going to reorganize you."
And ultimately Congress is able to do that. The Attorney General is,
as has been pointed out, a creation of Congress. Once again, oversight is murky.
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CONCLUSION

The last point I would make is that ultimately we are never
going to be able to clearly define what is the proper role of oversight.
It is a little bit like the way the Court describes pornography. You
know it when you see it. When the public knows and reacts against
Congress for overstepping its bounds, that is the only thing that
fundamentally keeps the Congress from engaging in excesses - an
excess of micro-managing, being unfair, overseeing in a way that
prevents the department from being able to function. Similarly,
when the Senate feels the Attorney General is operating outside the
broad dictates of the office, it will react. Fortunately, and finally, the
genius of our system provides a third branch of government that can
call the close ones; the Supreme Court. It is left to the wisdom of
the Court to say ultimately who is right and who is wrong in the
dynamic, evolving process of oversight.

